本来上周想放到网上，无奈人大破网。
昨天和老爸聊叶利钦，才知道他当年的毕业论文写的就是苏中关系。
纪念、回忆、评价的文章太多，看篇短的，简而言之，普京与叶利钦的不同。
Yeltsin's moment
Apr 26th 2007
From The Economist print edition
It was messy, but he gave Russia a future that Vladimir Putin is now putting in jeopardy
THE Russia where Boris Yeltsin was buried this week is a different place from the country where he assumed power nearly 16 years ago. Statistics tell part of the story. In 1992, the first year that such a calculation could be made, Russia's GDP—taking the rouble figure and dividing it by the average, market-determined exchange rate—was less than billion. Last year the finance ministry reported a figure approaching trillion. Over the same period foreign-exchange reserves have jumped from a paltry m to 0 billion.
Figures can mislead. But they say something about the pathetically weak terms on which the new Russian democracy, exhausted by communist mismanagement, entered the world economy; and about the transforming effect of market economics, however badly practised, on Russia's global standing.
It is not just the numbers that have changed. Although the Yeltsin era certainly saw its share of human-rights abuses (see article), it was by Russian standards a time of extraordinary liberty. And though many Russians remember the Yeltsin years as a time of chaos and decline, this was in fact the moment Russia used its new freedom to leave the dead-end of communism and reinvent itself as a country with a future. That freedom is, alas, now in peril. Only last week, the break-up of small protests in Moscow and St Petersburg gave a depressing sign of how far the country has moved backwards under Mr Yeltsin's hand-picked successor, Vladimir Putin.
Despite the respectful way in which he has lauded and buried his old mentor (see article), Mr Putin has encouraged the idea that the “order” he personifies is vastly preferable to the chaos, uncertainty and licence of the Yeltsin years. It follows that niceties such as legal process and a real opposition are things that Russia can well do without. Given that most of Russia's growth has taken place on his watch, Mr Putin can claim (with truth, unfortunately) that most of his compatriots prefer the “bread” of prosperity to the “circus” of democracy. And many non-Russians would sympathise with that; investors never knew what to make of Mr Yeltsin's erratic, ebullient personality and many instinctively preferred the polished charm of the Kremlin's previous master, Mikhail Gorbachev.
But think harder about the changes that Russia has undergone, and a different conclusion emerges. Mr Yeltsin's achievements have to be measured not against the ideal state of affairs which many of his own supporters expected but against the real danger at that time of an uncontrollable collapse in Russia's society and economy. Albeit imperfectly and in fits and starts, his reforms saved Russia from meltdown. The growth that Russia now enjoys is not just the result of a surge in energy prices—and the fact that at least a part of the oil bounty is being recycled into the economy owes a lot to the foundations of a market system that were laid in the Yeltsin years.
A large tumbler of freedom, with a vodka chaser
Mr Putin's performance in office, by contrast, can and should be judged by a more rigorous standard. A government that is sitting on a handsome budget surplus and a huge foreign-exchange kitty has options that were not available to Mr Yeltsin's struggling reformers. For example, a rich government can, in theory, fight corruption far more effectively than one which hardly has the money to pay judges or policemen. Yet by most estimates, corruption is getting worse, not better.
A rich government, you might think, could allow itself the luxury of tolerating and even encouraging a vigorous, fearless opposition far more readily than the near-bankrupt, embattled administration which Mr Yeltsin formed. Yet the margin for real dissent—whether on the street, in parliament or in the media—is growing narrower all the time. And this has practical consequences. A Russia where nobody dares to criticise the president ultimately risks forfeiting the very prizes of order and prosperity which authoritarian rule promises to deliver. That, surely, is Boris Yeltsin's posthumous message to his successor. Mr Putin would do well to take heed.
叶利钦最大政治遗产是面向自由
长平
不必等待时间的裁决，叶利钦注定是世界历史上浓墨重彩的一章。他的一生如此丰富，以致在他驾鹤西 去之后，各种人士都可以从中找到原料来烹制自己的美味。纵观国内舆论，要么洋洋洒洒地描绘着他的传奇故事，将那段风云激荡的历史演绎成以权谋论和厚黑学为 理论基础的宫闱倾轧，要么重复着激进改革祸国殃民的老调，不顾一些学者早已深入论证其谬误，过分功利地急于为己所用。我们认为，这两种态度都不足取，而必 须站在人类历史的跑道中，回头检视叶利钦的政治遗产，这时你会发现他的成败功过都维系于面向自由的姿态。
叶利钦政治生涯中最动人的身影，是在1991年苏联发生“8·19”政变之际，他一次又一次地站 在戒严坦克上发表演讲，号召人们反对政变者复辟专制铁幕的企图。他的勇敢、坚定和激昂的声音，成为历史关键时刻的一面旗帜，让那些在政变中迷惘无助的人 们，让这个天空刚刚现出一缕曙光旋即又被乌云遮蔽的民族，清晰地听见了自由的召唤。他虽然是戈尔巴乔夫的政敌，这种姿态却使他成为戈氏新思维精神的传承 者，也使他获得了一生中最大最宝贵的政治资本。在那一刻，坦克上的叶利钦，成为俄罗斯民族新的雕像，其光芒远远盖过了政变的对象戈尔巴乔夫，成为叶利钦时 代的真正的起点。
叶利钦一生中最大的政绩，是在集权专制留下的荆棘丛中，带领俄罗斯走上自由发展的道路。尽管他大 权牢牢在握，并不时重蹈旧时代的积习，但是他义无反顾地，为国家带来了自由的言论、自由的市场、自由的选举和自由的市民社会。他使俄罗斯有了公认的议会与 总统选举，也使别的十多个民族获得了独立发展的自由。尽管他的市场经济功败垂成，但是他实践了一次公正的机会，建构了一个基本的框架。他没有带领国家走向 公正，也没有引导人民达到自由，但是他强化了公正观念，打开了自由之门。
人们习惯于认为，叶利钦是一个破旧有功而立新乏术的人物。如果历史地看，其实破旧本身就是立新的 一部分。打破70多年的旧体制，并不是一朝一夕可以完成的事。在他执政5年之后，俄罗斯人终于放心地说，我们不会再回到旧时代了，因为权力监督的基本架构 已经形成，他本人也时常在权力的宝座中摇晃。这是对他的政治成就最大的肯定，也是破坏本身就是一种建设的行动、摇晃是一种真正的稳定的现代观念的证明。
叶利钦一生中最大的失误，也正是在于他没有始终坚定自由的姿态，没有彻底地兑现自由的承诺。他作 为一个旧时代培养出来的政客，一旦爬上权力的巅峰，身上带有的种种旧习随时都在发痒。有人认为他的一些行为是被迫的，那么也从另一个方面说明，在建设新时 代的广场时，他没有能够彻底地清扫旧时代的瓦砾，甚至随手捡起瓦砾来打人。
备受争议的是他的经济政策。苏联解体之后，俄罗斯陷入经济困境，引发了人们对所谓“休克疗法”的 反思。今天，越来越多的人们意识到，从私有化程度说，俄罗斯不如民主德国；从财政货币紧缩政策看，它不如波兰等东欧诸国；从市场经济的深入化看，它甚至不 如中国。因此，所谓“休克疗法”的激进改革是一个难以讨论的伪命题。越来越清晰的是，阻碍俄罗斯经济发展的，是旧有的权贵势力而不是市场新兴力量形成的寡 头经济。这些寡头统治，阻碍了真正的自由市场经济的建立，剥夺了人民自由创业的机会，加剧了社会贫富分化，使得叶利钦的政治声望一步步走向低谷。
正如一些学者敏锐地指出，最后使政治强人叶利钦陷入四面楚歌的不是自由民主，而是他对自由民主的 背叛，企图建立新权威主义。但是他所主张的自由精神已经深入人心，他所建立的民主政治已经让反对派足够强大，他的旧时代政客风格总是面临质疑，他的独断倾 向总是遇到抵挡，他所放任的寡头经济最终使自己尝到了苦果，在政治生涯的最后关头，他不得不作出一个交权的选择。他的交权，是民主政治中的一个权谋。一个 掌权者必须通过提前退位来确保自己中意的接班人，这本身就是对民选政治的一种尊重和依从，也正是在这个意义上，叶利钦为自己的政治生涯如释重负地画上了一 个句号，为他所留下的政治遗产作了一个最后的注释。
Damien Rice Sleep Don't Weep
看看现场表现 点
